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Abstract:  We investigate the optimal collection and expenditure of f unds for agricultural 
commodity promotion in markets where the processing and distribution sectors may exhibit 
oligopoly and/or oligopsony power.  The conditions that characterize optimal advertising 
intensity under perfect competition for funds generated  from either per-unit or lump-sum taxes 
do not, in general, hold when marketing is imperfectly competitive.  Simulation analyses show 
that imperfect competition always reduces farmers’ optimal advertising expenditure and that an 
imperfectly competitive marketing sector may capture half or more of the benefits from the funds 
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Optimal Commodity Promotion in Imperfectly Competitive Markets 
Expenditures for advertising and promotion are important in agricultural product markets in 
several countries.  Money to fund commodity promotion programs is generally raised from per-
unit assessments or check-offs on farmers and/or processor-handlers and expended by industry 
marketing boards.  These programs, due to the magnitude of money expended on them and their 
potential for raising producer incomes, have received considerable attention from economists 
interested in agriculture. 
Research has emphasized two main themes.  One focus has been the effectiveness of 
existing programs and the measurement of demand impacts of promotion expenditures and rates 
of return to producers.  Forker and Ward and Ferrero  et al. summarize this work, and Davis 
provides a recent critique.  Most recently, this work has focused on the distribution of benefits 
and costs of commodity advertising, including papers by Alston, Chalfant, and Piggot,  Kinnucan 
and Miao, Alston, Freebairn, and James, and Chung and Kaiser (2000a, 2000b).  Distribution of 
advertising benefits has assumed particular importance in the U.S. because litigation in 
opposition to mandatory promotion programs has been based on claims that the programs have 
disparate impacts across producer groups.
1 
A second area of research has been on decisions as to the magnitude of funds to collect 
and expend on promotion, in particular the derivation of conditions for optimal advertising 
intensity.   The genesis of research into optimal advertising expenditures is Dorfman and 
Steiner’s (DS) seminal analysis.  DS showed that, at the joint optimum of price and advertising 
expenditure, a monopolist sets the ratio of advertising-to-sales equal the r atio of the advertising 
elasticity of demand to the absolute price elasticity of demand. 
                                                                 
1 This litigation led eventually to a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court [Glickman v. Wileman Bros. And Elliot, Inc., 
521 U.S. 457] upholding the legality of such programs.   2
Some years later Nerlove and Waugh (NW) analyzed advertising by an agricultural 
industry board that had no direct control over price and output of the commodity but was able to 
influence demand by collecting and expending money for advertising.  Importantly, advertising 
monies were generated in a lump-sum fashion by NW’s commodity board.  Under these 
conditions, optimal advertising is characterized by the condition of e quality between the ratio of 
advertising-to-sales and the ratio of the advertising elasticity of demand to the sum of the 
absolute price elasticity of demand and the price elasticity of supply of the farm commodity.  
Denoting market price and output by P and Q, respectively, advertising expenditure by A, 
absolute price elasticity and advertising elasticity of demand by  0P and  0A, respectively, and 


















The NW formulation indicates a lower optimal advertising-to-sales (A/S) ratio than does the DS 
condition because the supply response from competitive producers vitiates partially the value of 
the demand expansion generated by advertising.  The more elastic the supply curve, the less the 
farm price increase generated by a given demand shift. 
  Several other studies have built upon these foundational works to generate conditions for 
optimal commodity advertising under a variety of market conditions.  Chang and Kinnucan noted 
that when advertising is funded by a check-off program, part of the cost will be shifted forward 
to consumers, leading to a greater incentive to advertise than when the cost is borne solely by 
producers, as assumed by NW. Goddard and McCutcheon and Kinnucan analyzed optimal   3
commodity advertising in a supply-managed industry, each considering cases when funds are 
raised from a per-unit tax or a lump-sum levy.  Alston, Carman, and Chalfant (ACC) derived the 
conditions for optimal commodity advertising when the funds were raised by a per-unit tax or 
check-off.  ACC found  that the original DS condition for optimal advertising is restored when 
funding is from a check-off program, as is typically the case.  Intuitively, an elastic supply 
response, which vitiates the effectiveness of advertising from a lump-sum tax, permits a  larger 
portion of a per-unit tax to be shifted forward to consumers.  At the margin these effects offset, 
causing the DS condition to be restored when advertising funds are generated from a check-off 
program. 
  The entire body of work that has examined extension of the DS conditions to advertising 
by commodity boards in agricultural markets has assumed a perfectly competitive market 
structure except for possible distortions caused by government intervention, e.g., Goddard and 
McCutcheon and Kinnucan.
2  This  assumption, however, has increasingly been called into 
question in agricultural markets.  The food industries in most countries have been characterized 
by rapid consolidation in both the processing and retailing sectors.  Concerns about possible 
market power abuses have led to a number of empirical studies to test for the exercise of 
oligopoly and/or oligopsony power and to the commissioning of governmental investigations 
into possible market power abuses in agriculture (e.g., U.S. Department of Agriculture (1996a, 
1996b)). 
                                                                 
2 Suzuki et al. and Cranfield and Goddard, respectively, have incorporated imperfect competition into studies of 
generic milk advertising in Japan and beef advertising in Canada.  However, these studies’ goals were to evaluate 
the effectiveness of existing advertising programs; they do not address the question of the optimal rate of 
advertising.    4
Although empirical evidence to date on the extent of actual market power in the food 
industries is mixed,
3 several studies have shown that even modest departures from competition 
can have important behavioral and distributional impacts.  Examples include work by Alston, 
Sexton, and Zhang and Hamilton and Sunding on the magnitude and distribution of benefits from 
research and Lanclos and Hertel, McCorriston and Sheldon, and Paarlberg and Lee on the 
impacts of trade barriers. 
In light of these results, we consider the impact of imperfect competition in the marketing 
of an agricultural product on the optimal advertising intensity for the product and also address 
the effect of imperfect competition on the incidence of benefits and costs from advertising 
expenditures.  We extend a flexible oligopoly-oligopsony model of an agricultural industry due 
to Huang and Sexton and Alston, Sexton, and Zhang to allow for commodity advertising 
conducted by an industry board.  Apart from enacting levies to support its program, the board has 
no influence over the behavior of producers or marketers and takes their behavior as given when 
enacting its policies.
4 
Contributions to the literature are twofold.  First, we derive the conditions for the optimal 
intensity  of advertising from funds generated by either a per-unit or a lump-sum tax for markets 
that may be imperfectly competitive.  Because perfect competition is a special case in our model, 
the results generalize the conditions for optimal advertising intensity to accommodate any setting 
of oligopoly and/or oligopsony competition.  The conditions characterizing the optimum differ
                                                                 
3 See Sexton and Lavoie for a general review and Azzam and Anderson for a review of studies of competition 
specific to the meat packing industries. 
4 This basic structure conforms with the manner in which commodity advertising is conducted in most countries.  
Examples include programs conducted under the auspices of U.S. marketing orders, Australian marketing boards, 
Canadian provincial boards and Canada’s Bill C -54 (Cranfield and Goddard), and dairy advertising in France 
through Maison du Lait.   5
 from the DS and NW formulations in ways that reflect the importance of departures from 
competition in the market. 
  Second, we investigate the impacts of departures from competition on the magnitude of 
commodity promotion and the distribution of its benefits for plausible industry scenarios.  To 
accomplish this goal, we first formulate a linear version of the imperfect competition model  and 
use a simulation framework to investigate optimal advertising by a commodity board under a 
variety of market scenarios.  Then we apply the model to commodity advertising in the U.S. beef 
and dairy industries.  This analysis indicates that oligopoly or  oligopsony power in the marketing 
sector may enable the sector to capture a large share of the benefits from commodity advertising.  
However, imperfectly competitive marketers also bear some of the incidence of an assessment, 
whereas perfectly competitive  marketers do not (under the assumption of a constant returns 
technology). 
Processor/retailer market power reduces a commodity board’s optimal advertising 
expenditure relative to the perfectly competitive optimum. A somewhat surprising result is that 
oligopsony power has a more adverse impact on producers’ incentives to undertake advertising 
than does comparable oligopoly power. Depending on the market configuration, imperfect 
competition may reduce the optimal rate of advertising from the competitive level  by nearly half 
and dissipate the farmer benefits from the expenditures by an even greater percentage. 
 
The Model    
We consider a model where an integrated processing/retailing sector, which may be imperfectly 
competitive, procures a primary agricultural p roduct from farmers, performs processing 
functions, and then sells the product to consumers at retail.  For simplicity, we usually refer to   6
this sector as “processors,” but it should be understood that the analysis applies to oligopoly 
and/or oligopsony power at any stage in the market beyond the farm gate. 
The agricultural industry operates under the auspices of a marketing board, which has 
authority to conduct a generic advertising campaign and collect funds from farm producers for 
that purpose.  The analysis focuses mainly on funds generated via a tax or check off, t, per-unit, 
but we also develop the condition to characterize optimal advertising from funds generated via a 
lump-sum tax.  Some marketing boards are also authorized to levy assessments on processors or 
handlers.  Given this study’s assumption of a constant returns processing technology, the results 
of the analysis are unaffected as to whether the tax is levied on producers, processors, or in some 
combination on both. 
The board has no direct control of farmers’ and processors’ production and pricing 
decisions, but it can rationally anticipate their behavior.  Accordingly, the analysis unfolds in two 
sequential stages.  Stage 2 is the production and pricing stage, where total production and sales, 
farm price, and retail price are determined, given farm supply, retail demand, processor costs, 
and extent, if any, of oligopoly and oligopsony power exercised by processors.  Advertising 
funded by a producer check-off program will affect farm supply and, if successful, also retail 
demand.  In stage 1, the marketing board determines its check-off rate and advertising 
expenditure to maximize producer welfare, given the behavior that will ensue in stage 2.  
 
Stage 2 Solution   
The retail demand function for the finished product is represented by 
(1)  Q




r is the market quantity of processed product, P is the market price, A = tQ
f is the 
advertising expenditure funded by a per-unit tax, t, on producers, Q
f is the market volume of raw   7
product, and  X denotes unspecified demand shifters.  The tax rate is determined in stage 1 and, 
thus, is fixed in stage 2.  The inverse retail demand function is 
(1’)  P(Q
r,Q
f,t | X) = D
-1(Q
r, Q
f, t | X). 
   Farmers are assumed to be price takers in  their output market.  Farm supply of the raw 
commodity with the per-unit tax is expressed as 
(2)  Q
f = S(Wf | Y) = S(Wp – t | Y),  
where Wf is the net price farmers receive after the per-unit tax, Wp is the price processors pay for 
the raw product, and Y denotes supply shift variables.  The inverse farm supply function is 
(2’)  Wf (Q
f |Y) = Wp – t = S
-1(Q
f | Y). 
  We assume constant returns to scale in the food processing technology and fixed 
proportions in converting the farm product, Q
f, into the finished product, Q
r.
5   Without further 
loss of generality, we can measure units so that the Leontief coefficient which converts farm 
product into finished product is 1.0, and, thus, Q
r = Q
f = Q.  There are n processing firms, which 
for simplicity we assume are symmetric.  Denote a representative processing firm’s volume of 
raw product purchases by q i
f = qi
r = q.   Given the assumptions on technology, the representative 
processor’s variable cost function can be written as 
(3)  C = c(V)q + Wpq, 
where c(V) represents the constant processing costs per unit of raw product processed, and V is 
the vector of prices for variable processing inputs.  The processor’s profit function can then be 
expressed as 
(4)  p = P(Q, t)q – [Wp(Q, t) + c]q, 
                                                                 
5 Although these simplifications ignore potentially important considerations, such as possible substitution between 
the farm product and processing inputs, they allow us to focus most clearly on the research questions posed by this 
study. 
     8
where Q = nq.  The notation for the exogenous variables X, Y, and V is henceforth suppressed. 












This equation can be rewritten as 
(5)  c t
dQ
) Q ( dW
Q ) Q ( W
dQ
) t , Q ( dP
Q ) t , Q ( P f
f + + q + = x + , 
or in elasticity form as: 
(5’)  f P(Q,t)1W(Q)1tc
(Q,t)(Q)
ØøØø xq






H=-  is the absolute value of the total price elasticity of retail demand and is 






e=  is the price elasticity of farm supply and is a function 
















are the so-called conjectural elasticities.  2 , 
[0,1] depicts the degree of competition among processors in procuring the farm product, with 2 = 
0 denoting perfect competition,  2 = 1 denoting pure monopsony (e.g., either a single buyer or 
collusion among multiple buyers), and intermediate values of  2 denoting various magnitudes of 
oligopsony power.  In general, larger values of  2 denote greater departures from competition in 
the procurement of the farm product.  > , [0,1] measures departures from competition in the sale 
of the finished product, with  > = 0 denoting perfect competition,  > = 1 denoting monopoly or 
perfect collusion, and intermediate values of  > representing various degrees of oligopoly power.  
From (5’), the effect of imperfect competition on market behavior is determined jointly by the 
market power index and the elasticity of supply or demand in the relevant market.  For example,   9
the impact of a given level,  >, of oligopoly power is  greater the more inelastic the market 
demand. 
Equation (5’) involves the total price elasticity of demand because a change in market 
quantity due to a change in price will induce a change in advertising expenditures, given a 
constant check-off rate t.  Based on the market demand function (1), this change in advertising 
will induce a further change in demand.  Imperfectly competitive firms who perceive that their 
actions affect the market must take account of both the direct and indirect effect of price on 
quantity (or, equivalently, quantity on price).  Totally differentiating the demand function (1) 





































































= h  is the elasticity of demand with respect to advertising expenditure.  Equation (6) 
reveals that the total elasticity is greater in absolute value than the partial elasticity due to the 
effect of quantity on advertising.  For example, an increase in price reduces sales both due to 
movement along the  ceteris paribus demand curve and to a leftward shift in the demand curve 
caused by lower advertising expenditures from the check-off program.   10 
Given homogeneity among processors, equation (5’) represents an industry equilibrium 
condition.  It can be solved in conjunction with the consumer demand and farm supply functions 
in (1’) and (2’), respectively, to obtain equilibrium values for Q
f = Q
r = Q, W
f = W
p – t, and P.  
Equilibrium values are denoted by an asterisk and are functions of  q,  x, t, c, the parameters 
defining the supply and demand equations, and the exogenous variables X, Y, and V. 
 Any impacts on market prices and quantities from an exogenous shock can be examined 
by totally differentiating (1), (2), and (5’) with respect to that factor.  Thus, the following system 


























xxHqqe ￿￿￿￿ -+=+-+ ￿￿￿￿ HHee ŁłŁł
. 
















01(1) tHt dt H
e
Øø Øø ¶¶









 measures the percentage change in  /  due to a one percent increase in the 





 is the percentage change in , due to a one percent increase in t.  Thus 
the effect of a small change in t on  market prices and quantity can be determined from equation 
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Stage 1 Solution: 
In stage 1, the marketing board selects the per-unit tax rate t and corresponding advertising 
expenditure to maximize producers’ surplus (PS): 









where Wf(0) is the supply curve intercept.  The first-order condition to maximize equation (11) is 
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as the condition characterizing the optimal tax rate.  Equation (13) indicates that the optimal per-
unit tax rate is reached when the supply-reducing effect of a higher tax rate is just balanced by 
the demand-expanding effect of the advertising  expenditures funded by the tax, so that a change 
in the tax rate has no effect on equilibrium quantity.  This same condition was derived by ACC 
in their study of check-off-funded advertising under perfect competition.   12 
Substituting this optimality condition into the comparative statics matrix (10’) in place of 








x¶x¶ Øø -=- Œœ H¶H¶ ºß
. 



































￿￿ hxxhxh ￿￿ =-+=+- ￿￿ ￿￿ hHHhHh Łł Łł
. 
All elasticities are evaluated at the imperfectly competitive equilibrium. 
Equation (15’) indicates that the optimal ratio of check-off-funded advertising 
expenditures to total sales revenue is equal to  the ratio of the partial elasticities of demand with 
respect to advertising and to price, i.e., the condition from Dorfman and Steiner and ACC, and an 
additional term.  This term consists of the oligopoly distortion term,  >//,  times the difference 
between  H,t E  and  0A/0P.  H,t E  measures how the total price elasticity of demand changes in 
response to a small increase in t.  











In general, (16) cannot be signed.  However, under plausible conditions d //dt > 0, so that 
increasing t and, correspondingly, A makes demand more elastic in total, thereby reducing the 
oligopoly distortion and providing an additional benefit to farmers from check-off funded 
advertising.  Two effects are at work in determining d0P/dt.  First, the supply shift induced by )t   13 
> 0 causes a movement upward along the existing demand curve.  For most functional forms, 
demand is more elastic at higher prices.  Second, successful  advertising shifts demand.  For 
example, if advertising induces a parallel shift in demand, as is often assumed in empirical 
studies, this effect also makes demand more elastic.  The benefit to reducing the oligopoly 
distortion is proportional to the magnitude of the distortion as (15’) indicates.  However, an oft-
cited rationale for advertising is to make demand for the advertised product less elastic, in which 
case producer-sponsored advertising has the perverse effect of increasing the oligopoly distortion 
ceteris paribus and creating a disincentive for producer advertising. 








hx ￿￿ ==- ￿￿ hH Łł
 
i.e., the  0A/0P ratio characterizing optimal advertising intensity in the DS and ACC formulations 
is reduced by a factor determined by the oligopoly distortion.  An oligopoly processing sector 
will always capture some of the benefits from an advertising-induced demand shift, whereas a 
competitive processing sector captures none, given a constant returns processing technology.  
However, the oligopoly processors also bear some of the incidence of the tax, whereas 
competitive processors bear none of it.  Although it is possible that the optimal tax rate is higher 
in the presence of oligopoly power in the marketing sector, (15’) shows that the advertising 
intensity for a farm commodity board is always less unless the advertising represents a way to 
reduce the oligopoly distortion. 
Importantly, oligopsony power per se has no effect on the optimal A/S ratio.  Because the 
supply elasticity itself has no effect on the optimal A/S ratio, as revealed by ACC’s extension of 
the DS condition to check-off funded advertising, neither does the exploitation of the supply 
curve by an oligopsonist.  However, this result simply means that optimal check-off funded   14 
advertising in a market with only oligopsony power is characterized by the same DS condition as 
applies in a perfectly competitive industry.  It does not mean that the actual optimal advertising 
intensities are the same.  In particular, oligopsony power causes lower sales and higher prices 
relative to competition, meaning that 0P is evaluated at a point on the demand curve to the left of 
the competitive equilibrium. Most demand functions are relatively more elastic at an imperfect 
competition equilibrium, causing the optimal advertising intensity to be less,  ceteris paribus, 
than under perfect competition. 
 
Comparison to Optimal Advertising Financed by a Lump-Sum Tax 
Our greatest interest is in advertising generated from a check-off program because of its 
application in the real world.  However, it is also instructive to analyze the optimality conditions 
under imperfect competition for commodity advertising that is generated from a lump-sum tax, 
i.e., the case analyzed by NW for perfect competition.  The optimality condition is set forth 




























, and all other terms 
are as defined previously. 
  When the market is competitive (i.e., q = x = 0) and the constant marginal processing cost 
is zero (i.e., f
* = 1 and P
* = W
*), the expression in (17) reduces to the NW condition.
6  
                                                                 
6 Nerlove and Waugh’s formulation does not incorporate a marketing sector, so marketing costs are implicitly zero.  
Incorporating a constant cost competitive marketing sector into NW’s model and assuming fixed proportions 
between the farm product and retail product,  results in the following relationship between elasticity of supply at 
retail,  ,r  and elasticity of farm supply,  ,:  ,r =  ,/f.  Thus, the NW formulation generalizes immediately to 
accommodate this type of marketing sector simply by interpreting their supply elasticity as the retail supply 
elasticity.   15 
Comparing (15’) and (17), we see that both the oligopoly and oligopsony power distortions (>/0P 
and  2/,, respectively) reduce the optimal advertising-to-sales ratio when advertising funds are 
generated by a lump-sum tax.  Under a lump-sum tax on producers, processors with oligopoly 
and/or oligopsony power capture some of the advertising benefits without bearing any of the 
costs. 
  The second term in (17) reflects that advertising might affect the elasticity of demand 
and, therefore, influence the oligopoly distortion.  As in the  case of a per-unit tax, if advertising 
makes demand more elastic, the opportunity to reduce the oligopoly distortion represents an 
additional incentive for producers to undertake advertising.  The opposite is true if advertising 
acts to make demand less elastic.
7 
 
Linear Model Formulation 
We turn now to a linear formulation of the model developed in the preceding section.  The linear 
model is used to conduct simulation analyses of the impact of processor market power on the 
magnitude of optimal advertising  and the distribution of advertising benefits and to analyze the 
possible impact of market power on optimal commodity advertising in the U.S. beef and dairy 
industries. 
The total market demand is: 
(18)  Q = a – aP, 
And the inverse farm product supply is 
 (19)  Wf = b + bQ. 
                                                                 
7 Note that for the lump-sum tax, use of the partial demand elasticity is correct because there is no direct feedback 
between output and the advertising expenditure.   16 
To facilitate the subsequent simulation analysis, we solve first for the competitive market 
equilibrium (superscript c) in the absence of any advertising (subscript o).  Through choice of 
units of measurement, the competitive equilibrium price and output are normalized to 
be
cc
oo (P,Q)(1,1) = .  All subsequent solutions can then be evaluated relative to the competitive 











where c is the per-unit processing cost.  The relations among the parameters are thus: a = 1 + a, 
b = 1 – c – b = f
c – b, where f
c = 1 – c denotes the farm share of total industry revenue under 
perfect competition.  In addition, the demand and supply slope parameters,  " and  $, can be 
expressed in terms of the retail price elasticity of demand and farm price elasticity of supply, 













Employing these normalizations and following the same approach as set forth in the general 
model, the equilibrium in the absence of advertising (subscript 0) in the oligopoly-oligopsony 












                                                                 
8 In the linear model, the values of both 0P and , depend in general upon the point of evaluation.  However, their 
values at any one point, say the competitive equilibrium, will condition their values at all other points.  Thus, we 
express both 0P and , in terms of their values at the competitive equilibrium. 
     17 
where W = (1 + x) + (1 + q)ab = (1 + x) + (1 + q)f
c c
P h /e
c.  S measures the cumulative distortion 
due to oligopoly and oligopsony power in the linear model.  If  2 = > = 0, the equilibria in (20) 
and (21) are identical. 
Now consider the introduction of commodity advertising funded by a per-unit tax, t, on 
producers.  Advertising is assumed to induce a parallel shift in retail demand as follows:
9  
(18’)  Q = a + z(A) – aP, 
where A = tQ.  To facilitate obtaining an interior optimum for A in the simulation modeling, we 
need to establish a specific functional relationship for z(A) that insures a positive and concave 
demand response to advertising, i.e., zN(A) > 0, zNN(A) < 0 .  The square root formulation, 
   z(A)AtQ =g=g , 
 was chosen both because of its simplicity and its ability to fit the data well in several empirical 
studies of demand response to advertising (e.g., Alston  et al. (1997, 1998) and Gasmi, Laffont, 
and Vuong).  The parameter  ( represents the effectiveness of advertising in shifting demand, 
given the square root formulation. 
It is straightforward to apply the framework of the general model to the linear version set 
forth in this section and solve for the stage 2 equilibrium.
10   Consider the equilibrium condition 
in (5).  Differentiate the demand function in (18’) and supply function in (19) to obtain:  















dP f . 
Substitute these expressions into (5), convert to elasticities, and solve for Q to obtain: 
                                                                 
9 This assumption is consistent with most empirical research on advertising impacts and also simplifies the 
simulation modeling.  However, it does entail a cost in generality because an advertising-induced parallel demand 
shift in the linear model insures that demand is more elastic at the new equilibrium. 
10 There is no need to solve separately for the competitive equilibrium with commodity advertising because the 
imperfect competition model nests the competitive outcome as a special case, namely when both 2 and > are zero. 












* and W f
* follow immediately.  Recall that the optimal per-unit tax rate, t
*, is 
characterized by the condition dQ
*/dt = 0.  Thus, differentiating (22) with respect to t and setting 













The optimal advertising expenditure, A
* = t
*Q
* is obtained by combining (22) and (23).  
The optimal tax rate in the linear model is characterized by six parameters: the farm share 
(f
c), the price elasticity of supply of the farm product (,
c), the price elasticity of demand at retail 
(
c
P h ) (all evaluated at the competitive equilibrium without advertising), the degree of oligopoly 
power ( >), the degree of oligopsony power ( 2), and the effectiveness of advertising ( g).  Key 














*, both effects contribute to reducing the optimal amount of advertising 
expenditures.  An increase in the degree of oligopoly power, however, causes producers’ optimal 
tax rate to increase because in the linear model both the tax rate and the advertising expenditure 
it generates work to make demand more elastic.  However, because the output base to which the 
tax rate is applied decreases as a function of >, the net effect of > on A
* is ambiguous. 
Among the other market parameters, 
*c
P t/ ¶¶h  < 0, reflecting that it is unambiguously 
better to shift via advertising a demand curve that is inelastic rather than elastic, and this basic 
result is unaffected by the degree of c ompetition in the market.  However, the sign of  Mt
*/M,
c is   19 
ambiguous.  Under perfect competition,  Mt
*/M,
c < 0 because an elastic supply response converts 
an advertising-induced demand shift primarily into an output increase rather than a price 
increase.  H owever, as noted, oligopsony power reduces the optimal tax rate, and the effect of 
oligopsony power is exacerbated by an inelastic producer supply, thus offsetting the 
aforementioned tendency for inelastic supply to induce a higher tax rate.  Finally, t
* and A
* are 
both increasing as a function of the advertising effectiveness parameter, (. 
Producers’ benefit from advertising is measured by the change in their producer surplus 











Similarly, processors’ benefit may be measured by the change in their profits across the two 
scenarios: 
**




Simulations can enhance our understanding of the impact of imperfect competition on the level 
of commodity advertising and the distribution of benefits and costs from advertising for 
alternative sets of plausible values for the market parameters.  After normalization, the linear 
model is characterized by six parameters (f, ,, 0P, 2, >, and ().  The key parameters for purposes 
of the simulation are those characterizing the extent of oligopoly and oligopsony power in the 
market,  > and  2, respectively.   Thus, we wish to examine optimal commodity advertising for 
alternative values of  > and 2, given a set of plausible base values for the other parameters.  In all 
cases, the farm share under perfect competition was fixed at one half: f
c = 0.5.
11  For the base 
                                                                 
11 This value is roughly in line with farm share for meats, eggs, and dairy products.   20 
simulation, we also set 
cc
p 1.0 h=e= , i.e., the price elasticities of demand and supply are unitary 
at the competitive equilibrium.
12  
The advertising effectiveness parameter,  (, was fixed based upon its relation to  hA,  the 
advertising elasticity of demand.   Given the retail demand function in (18’) and the square-root 
formulation for demand response to advertising,  0A, evaluated at the competitive market 












1 Q  and t
c can be expressed using (22) and (23), respectively, and the entire expression in (27) 
can be solved to yield  PA (,,,f) g=ghhe , i.e., ( can be expressed in terms of the other market 
parameters and  0A, the advertising elasticity of retail demand.  Estimates of  0A are available for 
various commodities from previous empirical studies.
13   Based on a review of these studies, we 
chose 0A = 0.05 as a representative value for the base simulation.  
 
Simulation results 
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of imperfect competition on the optimal level of taxation, t
*, for 
the base simulation.  The optimal tax is $0.052 under perfect competition (5.2% given P
c = 1).  
                                                                 
12 We also experimented with other choices of parameterizations for  c
P h  and ,
c.  From the comparative statics 
expressions in (24), we know that increasing  c
P h  ceteris paribus reduces the optimal investment in advertising.  For 
example, given 2 = > = 0.5, an increase in the demand elasticity (evaluated at the competitive equilibrium) from 0.6 




is ambiguous, in this simulation increasing ,
c on the interval  [1, 3.0] caused the optimal expenditure on advertising 
to increase, ceteris paribus, when 2 = > = 0.5.  Even though the increase in the producer price generated by a given 
demand shift is decreasing in ,, a more elastic supply reduces the extent of oligopsony exploitation for a given level 
of 2, and this latter effect is dominant when oligopsony power is important, as is true when 2 = 0.5. 
13 See Forker and Ward and Ferrero et al. for summaries of this work. 
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 Consistent with the comparative statics results, t
* decreases as a function of the oligopsony 
power exercised in the market, falling ultimately to $0.038 for the case of pure monopsony.  The 
tax is increasing in the level of oligopoly power, rising from $0.052 to $0.071 as > increases from 
0 to 1.  Joint oligopoly-oligopsony power, thus, induces offsetting effects on t
*.  Oligopoly, in 
general, is more important than oligopsony because the latter affects only the farm product 
segment of the input market (f
c = 0.5), and, thus, t
* is increasing as a function of the degree of 
joint oligopoly/oligopsony power. 
Although oligopoly and joint oligopoly/oligopsony generate a higher level of per-unit 




decreasing as a function of the magnitude of market power for all equilibria in the simulation, as 
Figure 2 illustrates. The decrease in Q
* due to market power dominates the increase, if any, in t
*.  
Figure 3 lends further perspective by depicting the optimal A/S ratio as a function of processor 
market power. The optimal A/S ratio declines as a function  of the degree of oligopsony power 
and joint oligopoly/oligopsony power.  However, oligopoly power has little effect on the A/S  = 
t/P ratio.  Both t
* and P
* are higher due to oligopoly power, and their effects roughly offset.  
Referring again to the general condition in (15’) governing the optimal A/S ratio, E H,t is 
necessarily positive in the linear model with a parallel demand shift and also greater than the 
ratio  0A/0P.  Thus, advertising makes demand more elastic, reducing the oligopoly distortion and 
providing an additional incentive for producers to advertise in oligopolistic markets. 
The impact of market power on the magnitude and distribution of benefits is more 
pronounced than its effect on advertising expenditures.  We examine benefits accruing to 
producers and to processor/retailers only.  Although consumers clearly bear a portion of the 
burden of an advertising tax in the form of higher prices, it is much less clear whether and how   22 
they benefit from advertising.
14  Total benefits accruing jointly to producers and processors from 
the optimal expenditure on advertising (the sum of the change in producer surplus and processor 
profits) for alternative market power configurations are depicted in Figure 4.   The percentage of 
the total benefits going to producers is provided in Figure 5. 
Although processor oligopsony power reduces the optimal advertising expenditure 
relative to perfect competition, the total benefits generated from the amount that is spent increase 
over a range of values for 2.   Although  producers’ benefits are strictly decreasing as a function 
of  2, processors’ benefits are increasing in  2.  Oligopsony power enables processors to convert a 
given advertising-induced demand shift into a relatively greater impact on price than would 
occur under perfect competition, thereby causing total benefits to rise over a range of values for 
2.  For the highest levels of oligopsony power ( 2  $ 0.81), the reduction in advertising 
expenditure caused by market power dominates the enhanced ability to extract  profits from the 
amount that is spent, and total benefits to producers and processors decline. 
The output restriction that is beneficial to processors is harmful to producers.  Producers’ 
benefits from advertising decline monotonically as a function of  2.   For example, for  2 = 0.2, 
producer benefits are 18% less than at the competitive optimum and 38% less for 2 = 0.5.  From 
Figure 5, processors capture 50% of the total benefits when 2 = 0.5 and over half of the benefits 
for all 2 > 0.5. 
Under oligopoly power, total benefits to producers and processors from advertising are 
always less in the base simulation than under perfect competition.
15  This result may seem 
                                                                 
14 For example, is it appropriate to attribute benefits to consumers from an advertising-induced shift in consumer 
demand?  These issues are well beyond the scope of this paper.  See Alston, Chalfant, and Piggot for a recent 
discussion of this issue. 
15 This result does not hold in general because plausible base values for 
c
Pc and he can be found wherein total 
benefits are increasing over a range of values for >.   23 
paradoxical because advertising expenditures for a given value of  > are always greater than for a 
comparable value of  2.  The reason is the effect of advertising on the elasticity of demand.  
Given the linear model formulation, both the supply shift induced by t
* > 0 and the parallel 
demand shift induced by A
* > 0 cause demand to be more elastic at the equilibrium,  ceteris 
paribus.  As a result, processors’ ability to exploit a given level of oligopoly power is 
diminished.  This effect applies not just to the incremental demand created by the advertising but 
to the demand in total.  Both farmers and consumers benefit from this reduction in the oligopoly 
distortion.  As Figure 5 shows, processors’ percentage of the advertising benefits under oligopoly 
(i.e., 100% minus producers’ percentage) is always less than their share under comparable 
oligopsony and is only 37% (100% minus farmers’ 63% share) at its maximum when  > = 1 (i.e., 
pure monopoly). 
When both oligopoly and oligopsony power are present in a market, the effect on 
producers’ benefits from commodity advertising can be extreme.  For example, even m odest 
market power as manifest by  > = 2 = 0.2 reduces producers’ advertising benefits by 30% relative 
to competition.  More extreme market power as represented by  > = 2 = 0.5 reduces producers 
benefits by 54%. 
As a final comparison, we show how imperfect c ompetition distorts the impact from a 
given advertising expenditure.  Specifically, we took the optimal level of advertising expenditure 
from each of the imperfectly competitive scenarios under consideration and asked how the 
magnitude and distribution of  impacts would have differed had that same amount been generated 
and expended under conditions of perfect competition.  There are two major impacts.  First, 
because imperfect competition reduces total production and sales, a given advertising 
expenditure is generated with a lower tax rate when the market is competitive.  Second,   24 
imperfectly competitive processors incur a share of the tax burden and receive a share of the 
advertising benefits. 
Figure 6a reports the percentage reduction in producer benefits from expending the 
amounts of advertising money shown in Figure 2 under conditions of imperfect competition 
rather than perfect competition.  Producer benefits from an advertising expenditure are always 
lower if the marketing sector is imperfectly competitive.  The reduction in producer benefits 
ranges from 9% when ( >,  2) = (0.1, 0) to 70% for the extreme case when ( >,  2) = (1, 1).  
However, the benefit accruing jointly to producers and marketers from a given advertising 
expenditure can be higher under imperfect competition, as Figure 6b illustrates.  For the market 
parameters studied in our simulation, a given expenditure always results in greater total benefits 
under oligopsony power than perfect competition because oligopsony power converts the 
demand shift proportionately more into a price effect than an output effect.  However, oligopoly 
power always reduces the joint producer-marketer benefits relative to competition in the base 
simulation.  Although oligopoly power also enables a demand shift to be converted into a higher 
consumer price than is attainable under perfect competition, this effect is more than offset by the 
reduction in the oligopoly distortion caused by the increase in the elasticity of demand.  Joint 
oligopoly/oligopsony power thus provides an intermediate case, with greater total benefits than 
perfect competition for modest levels of market power and less total benefits for more extreme 
levels of oligopoly/oligopsony. 
 
Application to U.S. Beef and Dairy Advertising 
Here we present illustrative applications to U.S. industries that feature generic advertising 
programs.  Beef and Dairy were chosen because of their importance in the realm of commodity   25 
advertising and because estimates of the necessary parameters are available from previous 
studies.  For beef, we utilized the following parameters:  2 = 0.178, > = 0.223, 0P = 0.527, , = 
1.689, f
c = 0.57, and  0A = 0.012.
16  Based on the linear simulation model and the indicated 
parameters, the optimal A/S ratio in the imperfectly competitive market structure is 0.017 
compared to 0.023 if the market were competitive.  Optimal advertising is reduced 16.5% by 
imperfect competition in the processing sector.  Producers’ benefits from advertising are reduced 
by 31% from their magnitude under a hypothetical r egime of perfect competition, and packers 
capture 55% of the benefits generated from the optimal advertising expenditure. 
  The dairy application relied on the following parameters:  2 = 0.0, > = 0.18 (Liu, Sun, and 
Kaiser), 0P = 0.16 (Suzuki and Kaiser), , = 0.14, f
c = 0.45, and 0A = 0.035 (Kaiser et al.).
17   For 
these parameters, the optimal A/S ratio under a hypothetical competitive regime is 0.017.  Under 
imperfect competition, it is 0.011.  However, total advertising expenditure is only about 5% 
lower due to imperfect competition, and producer benefits are reduced by only 15%.  Suppose, 
however, that > = 2 = 0.18 and all other parameters are as before (see footnote 17).  Then the 
optimal A/S ratio is only 0.009, roughly half its value under competition, o ptimal advertising 
expenditures are 15% lower than under competition, and producers’ benefits from advertising are 
reduced by 28%. 
                                                                 
16 The market power parameters for the beef industry, 2 and >, are from Azzam and Pagoulatos, the demand and 
supply elasticities are from Azzam and Schroeter, and the advertising elasticity of demand is derived from Ward and 
Lambert.  There is controversy regarding both the extent and importance of market power in the U.S. beef sector and 
the effectiveness of generic beef advertising, so the estimates utilized here should be considered as illustrative and 
not definitive.  See Sexton and Lavoie regarding the market power controversy and Coulibaly and Brorsen on 
disagreements over the effectiveness of beef promotions. 
17 The oligopsony power parameter was set at zero to reflect that considerable dairy processing capacity is in the 
hands of producer-owned cooperatives.  Oligopsony power could, however, be a concern if it existed at other stages 
of the marketing chain, e.g., retailing. 
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Conclusions 
Much has been written about the rapid increases in concentration worldwide in food marketing.  
The consequences of this consolidation for the exercise of market power continue to be debated.  
This paper joins the growing list of studies that examine the implications of departures from 
competition for various aspects of industry behavior. Prior work has emphasized the impacts 
upon an industry of exogenous forces, such as research-induced supply shifts (Alston, Sexton, 
and Zhang and Hamilton and Sundig) or various trade policy instruments (McCorriston and 
Sheldon and Paarlberg and Lee).  A unique feature of this study  is to examine the impact of 
imperfect competition on an endogenous industry policy instrument—the level of monies to 
collect and expend on a commodity advertising program. 
Results demonstrate that in the presence of imperfect competition, the optimal 
advertising-to-sales (A/S) ratio for funds generated from a per-unit tax is not, in general, 
characterized by the ubiquitous Dorfman-Steiner condition, shown to hold for the competitive 
case by Alston, Carman, and Chalfant.  Neither does the well-known Nerlove-Waugh 
formulation for lump-sum funding hold under conditions of imperfect competition. 
An imperfectly competitive marketing sector will capture a portion of the benefits from 
commodity advertising, but it will also bear a share of the costs under funding by a per-unit tax 
or check off.  A possibly important benefit of generic advertising in the presence of 
processor/retailer oligopoly power is that advertising may make demand more elastic, thereby 
reducing the distortion from oligopoly power and increasing  producer welfare—a benefit that is 
not present under conditions of perfect competition. 
Results from simulations based on a linear version of the general model showed that the 
optimal check-off rate from producers’ perspective is actually increasing as a f unction of the   27 
degree of oligopoly power in the market.  In contrast the optimal tax rate is always lower under 
oligopsony power or joint oligopoly/oligopsony power.  In all cases evaluated in the simulation 
model, producers’ benefits from advertising were lower, in some cases by half or more, in the 
presence of processor market power than if the market were competitive. 
Although the intent expressed in the various legislation that enables industries to conduct 
generic advertising is that farm producers are to be the primary beneficiaries of the programs, our 
analysis shows that an imperfectly competitive marketing sector may capture half or more of the 
net benefits generated by the programs.  Oligopsony power tends to have a larger, negative 
impact on farmers’ benefits from advertising than oligopoly power because advertising may 
reduce the oligopoly distortion through its effect on the demand elasticity.  One implication of 
this result is that in markets suspected of being oligopolistic, empirical studies o f advertising 
benefits should attempt to test not only whether advertising is shifting demand but also whether 
it has made demand more or less elastic.   28 
Appendix: Optimal Commodity advertising From a Lump-Sum Tax 
 
Here we derive the condition characterizing optimal commodity taxation under imperfect 
competition in the food-processing sector when the advertising funds are generated from a lump-
sum tax.  The retail demand function for the finished product is represented by 
(A1)  Q
r = D(P,A | X), 
or in inverse form by 
(A1’)  P = D
-1(Q
r, A | X). 




f | Y). 
A representative processing firm’s volume of raw product purchases is denoted by q
f.  Given our 
previous assumptions on the processing technology, the processor’s variable cost function can be 
written as: 
(A3)  C = c(V)q
f + Wq
f, 
and the processor’s profit function can then be expressed as 







r is the quantity of processed product produced.  As before we let q
f  =  q
r = q, a nd  
rfrf
QQQnqnq. ==== The notation for the exogenous variables  X,  Y, and  V is henceforth 
suppressed.  Maximizing profit with respect to q results in the following first-order condition: 
(A5)  ¶p/¶q = P + P’(Q
r, A)(¶Q
r/¶q)q – (W + c) – W’(Q
f)(¶Q
f/¶q)q = 0. 
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. 
All notation is the same as in the main body of the paper.   29 
From equations (A1), (A2) and (A6), we can solve for the equilibrium values of Q
f = Q
r, 
P, and W as functions of  q, x, A, c, the parameters defining the supply and demand equations, 
and the exogenous variables  X,  Y, and  V.  As in the main text, equilibrium values are indicated 
by an asterisk.  With a lump-sum tax, there is no feedback effect from quantity to advertising 
expenditure, and, thus, the total price elasticity of demand is simply the partial elasticity,  0P.  
However, it should be recognized that in general  0P is a function of both Q and A, and , is a 
function of Q.   
  The effect of an exogenous change in  A can be adduced by differentiating (A1), (A2), 
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 are, respectively, the percentage change in the price 
elasticity of demand and price elasticity of supply due to a 1 percent increase in A.  Thus the 
effect of a small change in A on market prices and quantity can be determined by simultaneously 
solving the equation system (A10):   30 
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Stage 1 Solution 
In stage 1, the marketing board chooses A to maximize producers’ net surplus: 
(A11)  ￿ - = - )) A ( Q ( W
) 0 ( W
* *
A dW ) W ( S A PS , 
where W(0) is the supply curve intercept. The first-order condition for maximizing equation 
(A11) is 
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Producers bear the entire burden of a lump-sum tax.  Thus, equation (A12) is simply a condition 
that the marginal revenue to producers from a marginal increase in advertising expenditure just 










Imposing this optimality condition for dQ
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Rearranging (A14) equation and writing it in elasticity form results in the following expression 
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Figure 4: Total Benefit to Producers and Processors from Advertising 
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